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Abstract—The challenge of providing security for Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks (MANETs) due to the inherent problems regarding to 
the use of mobile devices and nonexistence of fixed 
infrastructures, made them one of the significant topics in 
security and cryptography research area. In this way, several 
works have been done to propose lightweight and less energy 
consuming protocols. However, the use of an expensive 
cryptographic operation named Bilinear Pairing made the 
mentioned schemes heavy for such resource constrained 
environments. In this paper, we could propose an efficient public 
key authentication scheme over an elliptic curve based algebraic 
group rather than Bilinear Pairings. The results show that our 
proposed scheme requires less complex operations in compare 
with other related ones.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is a fundamental branch 
of science for achieving network and information security [1]. 
There are three types of PKC as described below. 
• Traditional PKC: Certificates are used to ensure 
about the authenticity of public keys. 
• Identity-Based PKC: user’s identity is their public 
key.  
• Certificateless PKC: user’s public key is generated 
by both user and Key Generation Center (KGC).  
The first type suffers from complexity of certificate 
management [1] whereas this problem is solved in Identity-
Based PKC via the solution given by Shamir [2]. More 
precisely, in Identity-Based PKC certificates are not required 
due to the use of user’s identity such as email address, digital 
image, and so on. However, the generation of users’ private 
key by Private Key Generator (PKG) causes another problem 
for this type of PKC named Key Escrow. It means all 
information transferred between entities is clear to PKG due to 
the knowledge of all users’ private key. In order to avoid 
mentioned problem Al-Riyami et al. in [3] suggested 
Certificateless PKC, a solution that became a beginning of a 
revolution in PKC. Afterward, various Certificateless PKC 
have been proposed in different areas in cryptography such 
Encryption, Digital Signature, Authentication, Key agreement 
and so on [4-8]. 
On the other hand, the wide accessibility of mobile devices 
and wireless networks caused that the applications of mobile 
environments such as Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) 
are growing rapidly and are not limited to military applications 
anymore. Due to the fact that these kind of networks do not 
utilize any fixed infrastructure and to keep the network 
working, nodes must work cooperatively, security became a 
challenging issue for such environments. In the beginning, 
many researches were done to provide solutions to prevent 
possible attacks such as Blackhole, Wormhole, Impersonation, 
and Modification [9-14]. However, it is clear that preventing 
all attacks and any combination of subset of them is not 
possible in practice [15]. Therefore, Cryptography became 
more appealing in providing security for the mentioned 
networks [15]. It might seem that because of the resource 
limitations in MANETs Symmetric Cryptography would be 
suitable [16] but it suffers from key management problem. As 
a result, PKC would be ideal solution [17,18].  
As mentioned earlier, Certificateless PKC has been used 
widely in various areas and MANETs are not exception.  In 
this area several works have been proposed recently [19, 20]. 
However, the use of an expensive cryptographic operation 
named Bilinear Pairing made the mentioned schemes heavy 
for such resource constrained environments. In this paper, we 
struggled to propose a lightweight public key authentication 
scheme in the context of Certificateless PKC that utilizes 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography instead of Pairings. It is worth to 
note that although our scheme is inspired on the proposed 
protocol in [19] named IDRSA, due to the elimination of 
Pairing operation it is much more efficient from complexity of 
computation perspective.  
The rest of this paper is as organized as follows. In the 
second section required preliminaries have been defined. 
Section three provides a concise review of the IDRSA 
protocol. In the fourth section, our proposed scheme is given 
in details.  Section five provides a comparison between our 
scheme and IDRSA from efficiency viewpoint. At last, the 
section six presents the conclusion of this paper. 
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II. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section we are going to provide required 
preliminaries for the rest of this paper. This section consists of 
two subsections including the utilized notation in the Related 
works and a brief review of main phases of Certificateless 
cryptosystems. 
A. Notations 
The utilized notations in this paper are described briefly as 
follows: 
•  additive algebraic group 
• : multiplicative algebraic group 
•  : a large prime integer and the order of the 
mentioned algebraic groups 
•  : the generator of group  
• : master-key  
• ̂ :  a determined bilinear pairing over 
mentioned three groups 
•  : an integer number that determines the number of 
bits for the public key of the RSA cryptosystem (  and 
) for existing entities 
B. Main phases of Certificateless cryptosystems 
In this section we present a brief review over main phases 
of Certificateless cryptosystems that have been introduced by 
Al-Riyami and Paterson in [3] named Setup, Partial- 
extraction, Set-secret, Set-private-key, Set-public-key, and the 
rest is depends on the type of cryptosystem for Encryption it 
will consists of Encrypt, and Decrypt phases, for Digital 
Signature it will consists of Sign and Verify and so on.  
Setup: In this phase by taking security parameter(s), 
a trusted third party named Key Generator Center (KGC) 
generates master-key  and system parameters 
(Params).  
Partial- extraction: The main goal of this phase is 
generation of a partial-private-key by the use of entities’ 
identifier and the master-key. Therefore, first a one way 
function of user’s identifier is computed. Afterward, the 
partial-private-key will be generated based on this value and 
the master-key. 
Set-secret: In this phase, an entity  who possesses 
identifier  chooses a random  as his secret value 
which will be utilized in the next phase. 
Set-private-key: By the use of generated secret value 
in the previous phase and the received partial-private-key in 
the second phase, each entity can set his private-key in this 
phase.  
Set-public-key: In order to generate public-key, in 
this phase each entity takes Params and the secret value as 
inputs.  
III. RELATED WORKS 
Since, our proposed scheme is inspired on RSA public key 
authentication scheme proposed by Eissa et al. named IDRSA 
[20], a brief review over mentioned scheme is provided in this 
section. The main point about IDRSA is that it can resist RSA 
cryptanalysis by making users’ public keys accessible to only 
trusted entities. In fact, each user is defined as a member of a 
coalition and the public obtaining process must be executed in 
order to obtain the users’ public keys from outside of the 
coalition. The main phases of IDRSA are as below.  
Setup.  
Public parameters of the system (Params) will be generated by 
a Trust Third Party. The mentioned parameters are as 
followed: : , , , , ̂ , , , ,  
These parameters have been introduced in Preliminaries, 
and  : 0,1 , : 0,1 , : 0,1 0,1  
are one-way hash functions. 
Node Initialization.  
In this phase several public/private parameters for available 
user/coalitions will be set. In IDRSA, each user/coalition such 
as “ ” with identifier  has three public parameters called 
Identity-key, General-key and Public-key. The first one is 
computable by all the existing entities  
whereas the second one is computable just by its owner . . Finally, the last one is computable only by its 
owner by accomplishing RSA algorithm hence,  is the 
private-key and ,  will be the public-key.  
Public key obtaining process.  
This process with the following steps should be performed 
whenever a user (such as A) from outside of the coalition 
requires public-key of a user inside the coalition (such as
). 
Step1:  : ,  
User A asks for public-key of user B ( , ) from 
the corresponding coalition while introducing itself.  
Step2: : , , ,  
The coalition sends tuple , , ,   to A if this user 
has been mentioned in a trusted list. Here,   , 
 that  is ̂ , ̂ , , .  
and .  
Step3: Public-key extraction  
At this stage user A can gain ,  via following  
computation;  ̂ , ̂ ,  , 
 , .  User A will accepts the public-
key if  . .  
 It is worth to note that IDRSA can work correctly if and 
only if the requesting user and the responding coalition reach to 
the same value. This issue is provable through the equality of  
and  at ̂ ,  as shown below. ̂ , ̂ ,  
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̂ , ̂ ,  ̂ ,  
 ̂ , ̂ ,  ̂ , ̂ ,  ̂ ,  
Therefore, this scheme works correctly. 
IV.  OUR PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
In this section we propose our Certificateless public key 
authentication scheme that does not require any Bilinear 
Pairings operation. In continue we describe our work in five 
main phases. 
1) Setup: 
The Setup phase is an algorithm that must be performed by 
Key Generation Center (KGC). During this phase, KGC who 
took security parameters generates confidential master-key   and publicly known parameters, Params, as followed: : , , , , s , , ,  
It is worth to note that  is a subgroup of an elliptic curve 
based algebraic group with generator element , the prime 
number  is the order of mentioned group and the integer  is 
the same as this item in IDRSA protocol. Moreover, : 0,1 , : 0,1  and : 0,1 0,1  are 
three collision-free hash functions. 
2) Partial-extraction: 
As shown in the Figure 1, in Partial-extraction phase, 
communicating parties, users and coalitions, refer to KGC and 
obtain the pair of partial public/private keys. Assume that a 
user or coalition who possesses  identifier contacts with 
KGC to take corresponding partial public/private keys. KGC 
randomly chooses    and computes  ,  
 and . Here,  is partial private key, while ,  is partial public key. It is necessary to point out that 
considered user or coalition is able to authenticate the received 
keys by checking equality . 
 
 
Figure 1.  Partial-extraction phase 
 
3) Set-secret: 
By performing RSA algorithm, the user or coalition  
generates  as its secret-value and ,  as the publics 
(that we call it RSA-public).  
4) Set-public/private-keys: 
The user or coalition  sets tuple , , , ,  as its 
public-key and the tuple ,  as the corresponding 
private-key. It is worth to note that here . 
5) Public key obtaining process:  
This process with the following steps should be performed 
whenever a user (such as A) from outside of the coalition 
requires public-key of a user inside the coalition (such as 
). Figure2 illustrates this process briefly.  
• Step1: In this step, user A randomly 
chooses  and computes . 
Then, this user transmits following message:   : , , ,  
This message shows the request of user A with identifier 
 for the public key of user B with identifier . 
• Step2: In this step, coalition i randomly 
chooses  and computes . 
Then, this coalition transmits following message: : , , , , ,  
The coalition sends tuple , , , , ,   to A if this 
user has been mentioned in a trusted list. Here, P, ,  that  is equal to   .  and . 
• Step3: 





 Since, in order to extract the public-key correctly the 
values  and  must be equal, A can checks authenticity of 
the received public key via the equation  . . If it does 
not hold then A will reject the received public key otherwise it 
will be accepted and A computes . 
As mentioned above, the values  and  must be equal to 
have a correct scheme hence we prove our claim by the 
following calculations: 
 
        







Figure 2.  Public-key obtaining process 
V. COMPARISON  
 
In this section we are going to show the superiority of our 
proposed protocol over IDRSA from complexity of 
computation perspective.  
Due to this fact that the computation of  and  values 
in public key obtaining process is foremost part in IDRSA 
and also our work, our focus for the comparison is just over 
this computation.  
In our proposed scheme we have tried to decrease the 
computational cost via eliminating Bilinear Pairings 
operation. As shown in the Table 1, the pairing operation is 
significantly more expensive than other group operations 
[21]. In this table, the Type 1 of Bilinear Pairings is not 
considered due to the low security level (not more than 80 
bits). 
Table 1.  Computational costs of operations inType2 and Type3 




Scholar Multiplication in G 
(SM) 
1 1 
Point Addition in G (A) Negligible Negligible 
Exponent in GT (ET) 3 3 
Pairing (P) 21 20 
 
Table 2 illustrates the overall computational cost of 
considered parts in IDRSA and our work.  
Table 2. Overal computational costs of schemes 
Scheme Computational Cost of 
operations 
ID-RSA (Type2 pairings) ET+SM+2P 
ID-RSA (Type3 pairings) ET+SM+2P 
Our proposed scheme 2SM 
 
Based on the information given in Table 1 and Table 2, 
the computational cost of IDRSA for Type2 and Type3 
Bilinear Pairings is equal to 46 and 44 respectively while this 
value is only 2 for our scheme.  
 
As a result, our scheme is more lightweight than IDRSA and 
it would be more appealing to be used in resource 
constrained environments like MANETs. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight public key 
authentication scheme for resource constrained mobile 
enviornments such as Ad-hoc networks. Through 
eliminating the use of bilinear pairings and performing 
elliptic curve based algebraic groups, the results show that 
our proposed scheme is considerably more efficient from 
computational complexity perspective in compare with 
other related works especially IDRSA scheme. 
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